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APPEAL
I. Fom mw REQuisrrES
A. Changes in Appellate Procedure
Supreme Court Rule 1, Section 1,1 as recently amended, re-
quires that a case be docketed in the court no later than 210
days after the date of the service of the Notice of Intention to
Appeal (which notice must be served no later than 10 days after
the lower court renders a decision 2) ; there was previously no
such limitation upon the time for docketing a case. The court
reserves the right to extend the time limit for docketing upon a
showing of good cause why the case was not so scheduled.
Furthermore, by addition to Rule 4, Section 3,3 the "statement"
in the appellate brief must also contain the date of the service of
the Notice of Intention to Appeal.
The supreme court added a second section to Rule 1 in regard
to court reporters.4 When the record on appeal includes testi-
mony which must be transcribed by the court reporter, the
appellant must make arrangements with the reporter at the time
of service of the Notice of Intention to Appeal to have him
deliver the transcribed testimony to the appellant within 30 days.
The trial judge may grant as many as 60 extra days for such
delivery upon a showing of good cause for the delay, but he
must provide for service of the order on all interested parties
and file such order with the clerk of the supreme court. Only
the supreme court may extend the time for delivery beyond the
60 days, and there must be a showing of unusual circumstances
which make the granting of such relief necessary.
Any court reporter unable to deliver a record within the
prescribed period must promptly notify the clerk of the supreme
court so that another reporter can be assigned. Failure of a
reporter to comply with these provisions may be adjudged con-
tempt of court.
i. S.C. Sup. CT. I. 1(1), as amended, Smith's Adv. Sht. No. 20 (Jim.
20, 1970).
2. S.C. CODE ANx. § 7-405 (1962).
3. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 4(3), as amended, Smith's Adv. Sht. No. 20 (Jun.
20, 1970).
4. See note 1 supra.
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B. Penalties for Non-Oompliance with Rules
In Long v. Gibbs Auto Wrecking Company5 the plaintiff
brought an action for conversion against Darrell Boatwright,
operator of a wrecker service, and Gibbs Auto Wrecking Com-
pany, an automobile salvage corporation. Gibbs' agents had
removed a car from the wrecker service's possession and sold it.
Boatwright filed a cross-complaint against his co-defendant,
Gibbs, to recover his expenses in attempting to regain possession
of the automobile. The trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff
against Gibbs for actual and punitive damages and a verdict in
Boatwright's favor against Gibbs for actual damages; Gibbs
appealed.
The supreme court refused to consider the appellant's excep-
tions with regard to Boatwright, because, while Gibbs served a
Notice of Intention to Appeal from the judgment for the plain-
tiff, he failed to serve such a notice with respect to the judgment
for Boatwright on the cross-action. In the absence of such
notice, the court held that it had no jurisdiction to review the
judgment entered on the cross action.
6
Supreme Court Rule 4, Section 6,7 requires that each excep-
tion contain a concise statement of law or fact which the court
is asked to review and that each be within itself a complete
assignment of error. In Mastropole v. Transit Homes," which
was decided on other exceptions, the supreme court refused to
consider the defendant-appellant's fourth exception because the
justices contended that they were unable to ascertain what
proposition of law or fact the appellant wished them to con-
sider. The court added parenthetically, however, that the par-
ticular law which the appellant was apparently attempting to
invoke would not have been applicable anyway. This statement
leads one to question whether the court would have scrutinized
the exception so harshly had there been any significant point for
review contained in the exception.
In State v. Hinson9 the supreme court acknowledged that it
has the power, in criminal cases, to waive failure to comply with
Circuit Court Rule 76.10 Under this rule a motion for nonsuiit
or a motion for a directed verdict must be timely made. The
6. S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-405 (1962).
7. S.C. SUP. CT. R. 4(6).
8. Smith's Adv. Sht. No. 20 (S.C. Jun. 20, 1970).
9. 253 S.C. 607, 172 S.E.2d 548 (1970).
10. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 76.
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motion for a directed verdict in this instance was not timely,
since it was made after the trial. The court found that the
motion for a directed verdict had been properly denied and
would have resulted in the same outcome even if it had been
timely made.
Another case dealing with Circuit Court Rule 7611 involved
a tort action against the owner of a freezer, who was also the
grandfather of the plaintiff. The minor plaintiff had lost
the sight of his left eye when it was lacerated by the sharp,
jagged corner of a handle on the freezer. In deciding Stevens
v. Mcaha,'2 the supreme court refused to consider exceptions
which challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the
verdict. In order to appeal from a verdict because of lack of
evidence, the appellant must have moved for a nonsuit or a
directed verdict at the close of the respondent's evidence. Here
the record failed to show a trial motion for a non-suit or a
directed verdict; therefore, the court held that it could not
consider the exceptions which challenged the adequacy of the
evidence to sustain the verdict.
0. Raising Question for First Time on Appeal
The most frequently discussed problem in the area of appeal
concerned the right of raising questions on appeal that were not
raised at the trial level. In State v. Anderson3 the defense tried
to invoke the in favorem vitae doctrine which states that in a
capital case the appellate court will take notice of any error
apparent on the record affecting the substantial rights of the
accused, even though the error was not made a ground for ap-
peal.14 The defendant, Anderson, was accused of murdering his
wife and was found guilty with a recommendation of mercy. He
received a life sentence as required by statute.'5 A number of
exceptions were made on appeal which admittedly were not prop-
erly preserved during the trial; the appellant based his right to
raise these issues on appeal on the above mentioned in favorem
vitae doctrine. The supreme court, however, held that the "policy
of reviewing questions not preserved during trial does not
extend to cases in which the defendant has received a sentence
less than death."16 The fact that the defendant might have
11. Id.
12. 253 S.C. 378, 170 S.E2d 758 (1969).
13. 253 S.C. 168, 169 S.E.2d 706 (1969).
14. See State v. Bigham, 133 S.C. 491, 131 S.E. 603 (1926).
15. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-52 (1962).
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been given the death penalty does not cause this doctrine to
become available.
In State 'v. Hal'17 the defendant failed to object to certain
jury instructions at the trial. The supreme court held that, by
failing to object, the defendant waived his right to complain of
errors in the charge on appeal. If a defendant fails to object to
charges or submit his own request for a particular charge, he is
estopped from challenging them on appeal.'
In Martin v. Mobley,19 the plaintiff-respondent was injured
in an automobile accident and brought this action to recover
damages. The jury awarded a verdict in the plaintiff's favor
for $7500. On appeal, the defendant contended that certain
testimony which concerned the plaintiff's having to support a
minor child was prejudicial, irrelevant, and immaterial. At the
trial, however, the defendant objected to the evidence only on
the ground that it was self-serving, and during previous ques-
tioning did not even object to the plaintiff's going into her
family situation, including the support of her son. Since the
objection that this testimony was damaging to the defendant
was urged for the first time on appeal and since the plaintiff
had testified in this area during the trial without objection, the
supreme court decided that such an exception could not be
raised and considered on appeal.
20
D. Issues Not Inweuded in the Record or Argued in the Brief
American Motorists Insurance Go. v. Murphy2= presents the
issue of whether or not evidence, which was not included in the
trial record, can be considered by the supreme court on appeal.
In this case the plaintiff insurance company brought an action to
recover premiums on policies sold by the defendant, a former
agent of the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that the liability
of the agent for the premiums continued, even though the agency
relationship had been terminated, because of a provision in the
written agency agreement.
The brief of the appellant recited certain provisions of the
agency agreement upon which the appellant based liability.
17. 253 S.C. 294, 170 S.E.2d 379 (1969).
18. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1210 (1962).
19. 253 S.C. 103, 169 S.E.2d 278 (1969).
20. See, e.g., McCormick v. State Capital Life Ins. Co., 253 S.C. 544, 172
S.E.2d 308 (1970) and Davis v. Greenwood United Telephone Co., 253 S.C.
318, 170 S.E.2d 384 (1969), two other cases decided during this survey period
which dealt with the same principle of law.
21. 253 S.C. 346, 170 S.E.2d 663 (1969).
[Vol. 22
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These provisions were not included in the parts of the agreement
entered as evidence at the trial and filed as the record on appeal;
therefore, the court decided that they could not be considered on
appeal. Furthermore, the court affirmed the trial judge's grant-
ing of a nonsuit, but did so based on a different ground, as
allowed by Supreme Court Rule 4, Section 8, which gives the
court the right "to sustain any ruling, order or judgment upon
any grounds appearing in the record."22
The question of abandonment of a point not argued in the
appellant's brief was presented in State v. Stalling.23 The de-
fendant was accused of assault with intent to ravish and assault
and battery of a high and aggravated nature and was convicted
of assault with intent to ravish. Included in the list of alleged
violations of the defendant's constitutional rights was the asser-
tion that "the jury was not drawn in accordance with Section
38-52 of the Code, because two-thirds of the names of male
electors between the age of 21-65, were not in the jury box." 24
The appellant, however, failed to argue this issue in his brief;
therefore, the supreme court decided that the point had been
abandoned in accord with the general rule.25 The question of
abandonment was also discussed in Shirer v. O.W.S. c Asso-
ciates26 where two exceptions were not considered on appeal,
because the court found that the exceptions were neither raised
by the questions involved on appeal nor argued in the brief.
II. Fu crios OF SurPRMM COURT AS COURT OF REVIMw
A. Review of Findings of Fact and Points of Law
In Shelley v. Shelley27 the supreme court, on its own initiative,
reconsidered a prior ruling in the same case and reiterated
the doctrine that the court has no authority to review findings
of fact in legal actions. On a prior appeal,2 8 Shelley was re-
manded for a determination of where the testator, the father of
the plaintiff and the defendant, intended a certain property
dividing line to be. On remand, the master to whom the matter
was referred found for Bevan Shelley, the defendant. The
22. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 4(8).
23. 253 S.C. 451, 171 S.E.2d 588 (1969).
24. Id. at 454, 171 S.E2d at 589.
25. See State v. Johnson, 241 S.C. 366, 128 S.F_.2d 664 (1962); State v.
Collins, 235 S.C. 65, 110 S.E.2d 270 (1959).
26. 253 S.C. 232, 169 S.E.2d 621 (1969).
27. 253 S.C. 238, 169 S.E.2d 764 (1969).
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plaintiff, Lanneau Shelley, appealed. The trial court without
a jury then entered a decree in favor of the plaintiff, from
which the defendant brought this second appeal. The second
appeal challenged the trial judge's factual determination as to
where the testator intended the dividing line to be.
The supreme court began the per curiam opinion by stating
that the justices were unsure of the soundness of their prior
ruling in which they decided that the will contained an equivo-
cation which could be explained by parol evidence. This state-
ment by the court is unusual, because the prior ruling was in no
way brought up as a point of appeal by the appellant. The
decision does, however, conclude that the first ruling was correct;
therefore, the precedential value of the original Shelley case is
not impugned.
On the second appeal the court reiterated that the court was
"limited to the correction of errors of law and . . . [was] bound
by the findings of fact of the circuit judge unless they are with-
out support in the evidence or manifestly controlled by error of
law. 20 Since the appellant erroneously based his appeal solely
on the supreme court's power to review the factual determination
made by the trial court, the court held that there was no issue to
be decided by it and thus affirmed the trial court's order. If the
case had been one in equity, the court could have reviewed the
facts; however, the court's prior determination that only legal
issues were involved in the retrial precluded the supreme court
from reviewing any factual findings unless absolutely unsup-
ported by the evidence. 0
An example of the supreme court's authority to reverse find-
ings of fact in equity proceedings is found in Mimson v. Mixson.31
The trial judge, by his own admission, let it be known that he
was unable to determine conclusively what amount of back ali-
mony was due the plaintiff-appellant. He stated that he had
placed the amount at $750.00, because that was the amount which
she was behind in her house payments. Thus, the trial judge
clearly invited the supreme court to review his factual findings
on appeal, which the court was free to do, since this was a
proceeding in equity.
In order for the court to review the findings of fact in an
equity case, the appellant must, however, show the court that
29. 253 S.C. at 240, 169 S.E.2d at 765.
30. Id.
31. 253 S.C. 436, 171 S.E.2d 581 (1969).
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the factual findings are "against the clear preponderance of the
evidence.13 2 The supreme court can, therefore, act as a jury
in equity cases whenever the facts are open to more than one
reasonable inference. Here the court completely rehashed the
arrearage issue and decided on an appreciably higher sum for
the appellant based on the facts of the case.
B. Power to Consider Appeal Before FinaZ Lower Court
Adjudication
An interesting predicament arose in the two cases of Young v.
Martin3 which were separate actions, one brought by Dorothy
Young for personal injuries suffered in an automobile accident
and the other brought by her husband, James, for loss of con-
sortium and the medical expenses of Dorothy and their minor
daughter. The wife's case resulted in a $10,000 verdict in her
favor, but the husband's case, tried by a different jury, was
decided in the defendant's favor. The defendant moved for a
new trial in the wife's case; the motion was denied by the
trial judge. The plaintiff, James Young, moved for a new trial
in his case, but did not specify any grounds for the motion.
The judge overruled the defendant's motion and issued an
order captioned for both cases which stated that, if for any
reason the verdict in the wife's case was overruled, the husband's
case should be re-tried as well as the wife's. The trial judge then
stated that he would hold the husband's motion for a new trial
in abeyance.
Uncertain as to the significance of this order, the defendant
appealed the two separate cases and the consolidated order. The
wife's case was reversed and remanded for a new trial because
of substantive matters unrelated to this survey topic. Turning
to the husband's case, the supreme court then stated that the
trial judge should not have ruled on a motion for a new trial
before arguments were heard and further contended that he
should not have expressed his opinion on the case. The supreme
court stated that the actions were separate, so it did not follow
that the husband was entitled to a new trial simply because the
wife had to retry her case. The husband's case was not finally
disposed of by the trial court, so the supreme court made no
decision as to the propriety of the husband's motion for a new
32. Id. at 450, 171 S.E.2d at 588, citng Odom v, Odom, 248 S.C. 144, 149
S.E2d 353 (1966); Todd v. Todd, 242 S.C. 263, 130 SXE2d 552 (1963).
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trial814 Rather, the court said that he could proceed in any
manner which was not inconsistent with the court's opinion.
Presumably, the trial judge's order saying that the husband
should automatically get a new trial is inconsistent with this
opinion, and the husband must state and argue grounds for a
re-trial, before the trial judge will be permitted to make a final
determination on that point.
C. Power to Review Moot Questions
In Ew Parte: South Carolina State Highway Department,3 5
the trial judge required that a pre-trial hearing be held. As is
the usual procedure in condemnation proceedings, counsel for
both parties were required to exchange expert evaluation figures
and data relied upon by the experts. The highway department
objected to this exchange, but the trial judge refused to rescind
the order to exchange the data.
After giving notice of intent to appeal, the appellant, reserving
any objections, exchanged the information; and the case went
to trial. After all the evidence was presented, the case was
settled. Following the settlement, the appeal was perfected from
the order requiring the exchange of the expert material. The
supreme court refused to consider this appeal, since the record
showed that the case had been settled; the court felt that the
settlement ended the litigation and rendered the issue moot.
The appellant argued that, although this case had been finally
settled, the trial judge's ruling would affect in the same manner
every highway condemnation case which might come before the
trial judge in question. Furthermore, the appellant urged that
the issue should be decided because of its effects on presently
pending cases. The court, following precedent, held that the
question was not a proper matter for review because of moot-
ness.16 "[T]he mere fact that the same question may arise in
other cases does not preserve the issue for determination in this
appeal. The settlement of this case simply left nothing for the
court to decide." 37
D. Disposition of Question of NoveZ Impression, on Demurrer
In Gantt v. UniversaZ O.I.T. Credit Corporation,88 a tort ac-
tion for invasion of privacy, libel and slander, and conversion of
34. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-216, 20-201 et seq. (1962).
35. 174 S.E.2d 342 (S.C. 1970).
36. See Berry v. Zahler, 220 S.C. 86, 66 S.E.2d 459 (1951).
37. 174 S.E2d at 344.
38. 173 S.E2d 658 (S.C. 1970).
[Vol. 2
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personal property, the supreme court refused to decide a ques-
tion of novel impression on demurrer - "Do mere oral declara-
tions afford a basis for the action based on invasion of right of
privacy?" 9 In citing an earlier South Carolina decision,40 the
court held that to decide a novel issue on demurrer would be
unfair to the current parties and to future litigants. The court
reached this decision, it would seem, because it was obvious that
the controversy, because of other issues, would be given ful
treatment in the trial court, and there was, consequently, no need
to isolate this one point of law for immediate consideration.
E. Power to Remand for Further Lower Court Determination
An interesting situation arose in Smith v. Smith,41 a divorce
action in which the appellant-wife was granted neither a di-
vorce nor a separation. The supreme court felt that the trial
judge's order refusing the divorce was so brief and incompre-
hensible that she had not been given a thorough hearing. The
cause was remanded for specific findings of fact and law. The
court stated, "We intimate no opinion as to whether or not the
wife is entitled to a divorce, holding only that she is entitled to
a judicious and comprehensive decision of that issue."42
F. Power to Make Result Come Out "Fair"
In an amazingly frank opinion in Adams v. Marchbank,43
the supreme court admitted tailoring the principles of law to
reach the desired result. In an action by the purchaser against
the vendor for conversion of a dock and ramp which the pur-
chaser alleged to be part of the property sold, the trial court ad-
mitted parol evidence which apparently contradicted terms of
the written agreement. On appeal the supreme court went
through legal gymnastics to say that the law in this state pre-
cluded admission of the testimony; but, since the result of the
trial court's action was just, the court found that the admission
of the evidence was non-prejudicial and came under the harmless
error rule.
39. Id. at 660.
40. Springfield v. Williams Plumbing Supply Co., 249 S.C. 130, 153 S.E2d:
184 (1967).
41. 253 S.C. 350, 170 S.E2d 650 (1969).
42. Id. at 356, 170 S.EX2d at 652.
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M-i. PAnTS AGGRIEVED
In Bives v. Knight," in testimony before a master, the de-
fendant, M.E. Knight, swore that certain stock in a merchan-
dise store belonged to his wife. The master found, however, that
the defendant was the true owner, and, therefore, permitted the
stock to be taken for the previous judgment. Section 7-2 of the
Code" permits any person aggrieved to appeal, but the court
found that, since Knight had testified that he did not own the
store stock, he was not an aggrieved party within the meaning
of that section.
The court stated that an aggrieved party, as that term, is used
in section 7-2, is "one who is injured in a legal sense; one who
has suffered an injury to person or property."46 Where the
defendant owned no property which could be affected by the
court's order, the defendant could not be an aggrieved party.
M. CARRINGToN SALLEr
44. 254 S.C. 10, 173 S.E2d 150 (1970).
45. S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-2 (1962).
46. 254 S.C. at 10, 173 S.E.2d at 152.
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